Tag: state-elections

Jharkhand is a mandate of the poor, for their rights.

Source – hindustantimes.com

The verdict for the Jharkhand assembly is, first and foremost, a verdict in favour of a new localism, and is a reflection of people’s voice overwhelming the arena of state elections in India.

One key issue, which helps frame the meaning of the verdict, is the struggle of adivasis against purported amendments to their land rights by the Raghubar Das-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, with its acquisition deemed unjust in the name of intended development. At an even deeper level, the protest of poor people on this and other related issues of their rights as tribal citizens — specially through the pathalgadi movement— brings to fore their belief in the salience of the Constitution and voting or matdan as a preferred form of political change. At the very least, it is the “demand side” of politics, especially from the asymmetrically placed poor voter, powerless and vulnerable, that has overwhelmed and realigned the “supply side” on offer from political parties.

Conventional vectors used to understand Jharkhand fail to explain this new turn. For one, the verdict is not just about identities of the tribal, nor is it about the manipulation of patronage and money — for long considered the bane of Jharkhand politics. Nor are the outcomes simply a reflection of the overwhelming “arithmetic” of the coalition.

First the outcome itself: The formidable majority obtained by the pre-poll alliance of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), the Congress, and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), is a historic first for this alliance in general, and the JMM in particular. Since Jharkhand was formed in November 2000, following its bifurcation from the erstwhile larger state of Bihar, and since its first state election 2005, the 81-member assembly has always seen fragmented verdicts, with post-poll coalitions being stitched to form governments.

The BJP championed the struggle for the new state. But it has only ruled with the support of the JMM, and, subsequently, with the support of the All Jharkhand Students Union led by Sudesh Mahto, and by engineering defections from Jharkhand Vikas Morcha led by Babulal Marandi — an erstwhile BJP chief minister (CM).

In 2014, the BJP central leadership decided to appoint a non-tribal leader as CM in Raghubar Das. The understanding was that at just about 27% of the population, and with sub-tribal internal differences such as those between the Santhals, Mundas, and Oraons, the BJP could play a “caste plus tribe politics” of vote banks. This would include the Mahtos (17%) under the leadership of ally Sudesh Mahto, and forward castes and urban voters. It is noteworthy that in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, as the Hindustan Times reported on November 2, the Narendra Modi-led BJP polled 70% of the Other Backward Classes (OBC) vote, 60% of the upper-caste vote, and 65% of the Hindu Scheduled Tribe votes.

In the state elections, however, this assumption of a fused tribe-caste vote bank in favour of the BJP proved erroneous. Tribal fears about dilution of the Chotanagpur Tenenacy Act (1908), and the Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act (1949) were rampant. The CM had, in the assembly, moved an amendment to the central land acquisition Act, such that the state government was no longer required to conduct social impact assessments, provide for schools, colleges; nor social security for the displaced.

On many occasions, paltry sums were given to the tribals in exchange for land. This stoked fears among the tribals. After all, Shibu Soren earned the name of being the “Dishom Guruji” for having struggled to free the tribal poor from the clutches of the money lender, and to get their land back. The pathalgadi movement, centred in Khoonti, was a movement in revolt. A constitutional protest, it sought to uphold the rights of tribals under Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, and the role of gram sabha in prior consent to developmental schemes, and was an assertion of their human rights. Citizens cast these constitutional rights in stones, pathal, and erected these outside their village boundaries. The state government responded with force, and more than 10,000 FIRs were registered on protesting tribals. The JMM campaign was pitched primarily on the issue of land-rights of tribals. It also promised implementation of the recommendations of the Sachar Committee report, and reservations in jobs for locals in the private sector. An alliance of tribals, minorities, and the poor among caste Hindus coalesced on the ground to support the coalition that Hemant Soren will lead, reaping the legacy of his father.

For the BJP, the lessons are simple. For a party that had strong foundations in the Jharkhand area, and among the tribals, the unabashed adoption of developmentalism alienating tribal rights cannot be premised in majoritarianism or strong political backing of the Centre. The party needs to go back to the grassroots, where it has a base of work with the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashrams and other educational activities.

Many would like to see this as a return of the regional party politics, a victory of loose coalitions against a strong centre, a format prevalent since the 1990s. However, when one aligns oneself to the ground, listening to the voices of the poor, and adopts a lens of political geography that foregrounds the meaning of Jharkhand, it is clear that this is a massive mandate of the poor.

Understanding the local, in Jharkhand and beyond.

Source – hindustantimes.com

Interpreting state election results is fraught with risk, as analysts combine explanations that rarely point in the same direction. The data suggests that state elections are fought and won on local lines, and that recognisable regional leadership can put a challenge to national political figures, as has happened in many of the recent assembly elections. At the same time, analysts try to interpret the meaning of the outcome in the larger political framework — national politics or the next state election.

In the recently concluded election in Jharkhand, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Mahagathbandan (MGB) of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, the Rashtriya Janata Party and the Congress have similar vote shares — 33.4% for the BJP and 32.6% for the MGB. But the margin suggests that the latter’s victory could easily have been a landslide but for a few thousand votes. Sixteen Members of Legislative Assembly have been elected with margins of less than 5%, nine of them from the BJP.

The MGB’s advantage lay in the tribal belts, where the JMM won 16 seats and the Congress six, against the BJP’s two. Participation was also higher in these areas, particularly the Santhal Parganas Division and the Kolhan Division, which the MGB swept. It’s proof that the alliance successfully channelised voters’ discontent with the incumbent’s performance. Given the relatively small size of the assembly — 81 seats — local and subregional dynamics are more likely to have had an impact on the outcome, more so than in larger states where those effects tend to be more diluted.

Another factor that played in favour of the alliance is the BJP’s decision to go alone in the polls. Its erstwhile partner, the All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU), cost the party the vote share it needed to stay ahead. The AJSU’s effort to mobilise the Other Backward Castes — the Kurmis in particular — considerably harmed the BJP, particularly in central Jharkhand, where the Congress performed well even in urban seats.

In retrospect, the decision to go alone proved fatal for a BJP led by an unpopular chief minister. Jharkhand’s history, with no party ever winning a majority in the House since the creation of the state, should have informed the party of the uphill task. The cumulative vote share of the main contenders — the BJP, Congress and JMM — over the past four elections has been 49.9% in 2005, 51.6% in 2009, 62% in 2014 and 68.7% in 2019, respectively. Even though the vote share of the main contenders is steadily going up, it still leaves one out of three voters not opting for any of the major contenders. It signifies the importance of local factors as well as local political forces.

Among the national parties, the Jharkhand success shows the Congress that it pays off to assume the role of junior partner in a pre-electoral alliance. Its candidates underperformed compared to the JMM candidates, particularly when in direct contest with the BJP. The Congress had a difficult task against the BJP in urban and general seats, but contesting fewer seats compensated for its comparative weakness of having no visible leadership. It left the stage to Hemant Soren, who was projected as the chief ministerial candidate. The Jharkhand results may lead the party to reconsider its alliance strategies in upcoming elections in Delhi and Bihar.

For the BJP, this is an opportunity to rethink its strategy in state elections. Though one can argue that the party has maintained its vote share, the Jharkhand result is a setback, particularly when some of its national policies are backfiring and the economy continues to be weak. Even if there is no clear impact of the current national controversies in the Jharkhand election, the fact that the BJP campaigned exactly on those issues and lost shows these issues have little endorsement at the regional level. They don’t seem to compensate for the state government’s lacklustre performance.

The BJP’s post-2014 winning spree in state polls created an image of the party’s dominance, if not hegemony. The results of the last six state elections show that while the BJP uses its strengths to make inroads in new political spaces, it is unable to use the same cards to retain power. This will have far-reaching consequences for the BJP at the Centre, which will become increasingly dependent on non-BJP states to implement its policies. Many chief ministers — including within the National Democratic Alliance — going back on the National Register of Citizens is one of the first examples of future hurdles.

In such a situation, the BJP is left with only two options. Either it tightens its grip on the organisation and centralises powers further, including pushing on levers against state governments. Or it gives some leeway to its state organisations and regional leaders, and lets them lead the fight on local or regional terms. One can, though, argue that the BJP normally doesn’t let its grip go on its regional structure. The alternative would be the route chosen by Indira Gandhi, who, faced with mounting challenges from the states, both from within and outside her party, concentrated powers further to the point of rupture with democratic norms.